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Article 3

COMMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS AND UNIVERSAL FRANCHISE
The Commission; Its Goals and Methods
In the Civil Rights Act of 19571 Congress created the United States
Commission on Civil Rights. The Commission was established as an independent
agency within the executive department. 2 With respect to voting, Congress
directed the Commission to investigate sworn written allegations of discrimination. 8 The Commission was required under the4 statute to submit a report by
September 9, 1959 to Congress and the President.
The Commission's report drew immediate fire from southern members of
Congress. Much of the attack by the southern critics related to the methodology
of the Commission. The selection of Dean George M. Johnson of Howard
University Law School to serve as Director of Planning and Research produced a
bitter attack from a southern critic, who referred to the Howard University law
students as "NAACP's corps of part-time law clerks."' The use of secondary
7
source material of questionable reliability was heavily criticized.
Evaluation of the report requires an acknowledgment of the fact that the
Senate delayed in confirming the nominees to the Commission and the President
delayed in making nominations.8 The Commission operated under the severe
handicap of uncooperative behavior by some of the state officials, notably in
Alabama. The Commission reported "a general lack of reliable information on
voting according to race, color, or national origin", and recommended compilation
of voting statistics, by race, by the Bureau of Census. No sworn complaints were
submitted to the Commission until August, 1958-almost a year after passage of
the Act of 1957 and less than 13 months prior to the date of the scheduled report
required by the Act." The Commission found itself additionally handicapped by
the provision in the Act requiring it to request that the Attorney General petition
for court orders compelling compliance with Commission subpoenas by contumacious witnesses instead of permitting direct petition by the Commission itself.10
171 STAT. 634 (1957), 42 U. S.C. S 1975 (1958).
2 71 STAT. 634 (1957), 42 U. S.C. S 1975(a) (1958).
3 71 STAT. 635 (1957), 42 U. S. C. § 1975c(a) (1) (1958).
'71 STAT. 635 (1957), 42 U. S.C. 5 1975c(b) (1958).
5 See, e. g., remarks by Senator Talmadge (Ga.), 105 CONG. REc. 17365 (Sept. 10,
1959).
OSpeech by Senator Ellender (La.), 105 CONG. REC. 18028 (Sept. 14, 1959).
SIbid, e. g.
8 The President first nominated Commissioners on November 7, 1957. He nominated
the first staff director on February 18, 1958. The Senate confirmed commissioners in March,
1958, after a delay caused in part by the resignation of one of the original nominees, Mr.
Justice Reed. The staff director was not confirmed until May 14, 1958.
9 REPORT of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1959, p. xiii.
1071 STAT. 636 (1957), 42 U. S. C. S 1975d(g) (1958).
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The report of the Commission, in fact, asked Congress to remove this impediment
and to allow the Commission to apply directly for orders enforcing such subpoenas. 1
Notwithstanding the difficulties under which the Commission functioned,
useful information was supplied to Congress. The information gathered or compiled by the Commission revealed little indication of voting discriminations in
the North 12 and West, and considerable evidence of deprivation of voting rights
in the South. This deprivation was reflected in voting statistics, in testimony at
public hearings held by the Commission, and in state statutes and constitutional
provisions governing the electoral process.
The provisions in the statutes are fascinating, if disheartening, tributes to
the ingenuity of men. Let the "grandfather clause" be held to contravene the
Fifteenth Amendment.' 3 Let the poll tax be repealed by the states themselves or
by amendment to the Constitution of the United States."4 Let the "White
primary" be condemned on constitutional grounds.' 5 None of these developments,
alone or in combination, pierces the resources of determined legal imaginations
dedicated to disenfranchisement of a race. The report of the Commission makes
clear, through discussion of the legislative history of some of the state constitutions
and statutes, that their purpose was boldly and patently to deprive Negroes of the
vote. Quoting from the Official Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Louisiana, 1898, the Commission cites the closing remarks of the Convention's President:
"We have not drafted the exact Constitution that we should like to have
drafted; otherwise we should have inscribed in it, if I know the popular
sentiment of this state, universal white manhood suffrage, and the exclusion
from the suffrage of every man with a trace of African blood in his veins.
• .. What care I whether the test we have put be a new one or an old one?
What care I whether it be more or less ridiculous or not? Doesn't it meet the
case? Doesn't it let the white man vote, and doesn't it stop the Negro from
voting, and isn't that what we came here for? (Applause.)" 16

Findings of the Commission
Whether reached by study of southern election statutes and constitutional
provisions as reported by the Commission, or by personal research, two conclusions
are inevitable. The first conclusion is that innumerable methods of restricting
voting by Negroes can be devised which, on their face, do not contravene the
11 Op. cit.
supra, at 139.
1 The Commission did find that Spanish-speaking residents of New York were frequent
objects of disenfranchisement, an allegation repeated often in the Senate debates of 1960.
13 Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915).
14 Since 1944, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee have abandoned the poll tax.
15 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S.649 (1944).
'1 Op. cit. supra, at 33.
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Fifteenth Amendment. These methods-provisions in state codes and constitutions
-are efficient in themselves. Supplemented by biased administration by state
officials and by intimidation, they can be doubly effective. Another inevitable
conclusion is that these provisions relate chiefly to qualifications for registration
and voting. Best known of the qualification provisions is the so-called "literacy
test". In Louisiana the literacy test does not take the actual form of a requirement
that the registrant be able to read and write. Instead, the Constitution requires that
the registrant be able to interpret any provision in the Constitution of Louisiana
or the Constitution of the United States. 7 The writer trusts that it was with
mock seriousness that Senator Russell Long of Louisiana defended the fairness of
the Louisiana literacy tests in the early stages of the 1960 civil rights debate:
"The only requirement in that respect is that a person must be able to
read a section of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Louisiana and he could be asked to give a reasonable explanation of it. But that test
is not given in English. If the person speaks French or Italian or some other
language, the test is given to him in his native language.
"Much has been made about the test of a person's being asked to interpret
any action of the Constitution. The interpretation given of the test by the
Senator from New York is that a person must be able to interpret every
section of the Constitution. That is not what is meant. The test is that one
must be able to give some reasonable explanation of anything written in
either the State Constitution or the Federal Constitution. If he can read
only a few lines, such as the 14th Amendment, that would be satisfactory.
Any colored man should be able to tell what that means, should he not? Or
he might be able to read the 15th Amendment. He must be able to read any
section and give a reasonable explanation of what that section means. The
law does not require him to read every section. It requires him to 8read any
section. If a person can give an explanation, he can be registered." '

Any literacy test lends itself to subjective administration by state officials.
Negro residents of Bolivar County, Mississippi, told the Commission that after
having been directed to write "a reasonable interpretation" of a section of the
State Constitution, they were denied registration with the words, "your replies
won't do". 1 The opportunity for subjectivity is especially great when the state
20
officials determining qualification have vague statutory standards to guide them
17 "Character and Understanding. If he is not able to read or write, then he shall be
entitled to register if he shall be a person of good character and reputation, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Louisiana, and shall
be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of either Constitution when read to him by the registrar, and he must be well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the State of Louisiana and of the United States and must understand the duties
and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government." LA. CoNsT., ART.
VIII, S 1 (d). Moreover, Louisiana citizen seeking to register must be able to write out
the application forms without assistance or suggestions, and be intelligent enough to compute the number of years, months, and days he has lived. See State ex. rel. Smith v. Dardenne, 129 La. 835, 56 So. 905 (1911).
18 106 CONG. REc. 3900 (Mar. 2, 1960).
19
20 Op. cit. supra, at 59.

LA. CoNs'r., Art. VIII, 5 1 (d).
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or where, as in Louisiana or Mississippi, 21 the applicant must "interpret" possibly
abstruse constitutional provisions to the satisfaction of the officials. It is interesting
to note that in some states the applicant for registration must meet statutory
literacy standards subject to the approval of the registrar, but the registrar himself
22
need not have any special qualifications.
The list of restrictive qualifications is endless. The Alabama "voucher"
system 2" requires applicants for registration to be endorsed by enrolled voters and
limits to two the number of applicants any voter may endorse. The North Carolina
statutes give permanent registration to some voters, but not to others. 2- A recent
Georgia statute allows a registrar to select those applicants who, in his judgment,
should be required to answer thirty questions about civics and Georgia govern25
ment.
Negroes who meet the statutory qualifications, even as determined by biased
administrators, may find themselves unable to register because the registrars cease
to work 28 or because the identity of the registrars is kept secret.27 Economic
reprisals or long delays may be the cup of Negroes seeking to vote.28 On election
day, the precinct may have one voting line and ballot box for Negroes, and
29
another voting line and ballot box for white persons.
The legal and extra-legal weapons designed to curb Negro enfranchisement
are effective deterrents. It is true that the low ratio of Negro voters in the South
cannot be attributed solely to the legal and extra-legal weapons. There is voter
apathy everywhere in America, among citizens of all races. It would not be surprising if many Negroes in the South, having had little educational opportunities
and feeling something less than enthusiasm for the candidates on the ballot, are
genuinely apathetic about the franchise. But the statistics defy the conclusion that
apathy is the primary cause of low Negro registration. In each of the states which
compose the Confederacy, save Tennessee, Texas and Arkansas, the ratio of nonwhites of voting age to white persons of voting age is at least twice as great as
the ratio of registered non-whites to registered whites. Apparently the most
severe voting problem, in this connection, is in Mississippi. "0 No statistics, by
21

MISS. CONST. ART. XII,

S 244.

E. g., see VA. CODE, tit. 24, c. 3 and c. 6 (1958 Cum. Sup.); cf. VA. CO NST., Art.
II, 5 20, 23. See also ALA. CODE 1940, tit. 17.
23 Op. cit. supra, at 76.
24
N. C. GEN. STAT., c. 163, § 32 (1952).
25 GA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, c, 34-1 (Supp. 1958).
26 Op. cit. supra, at 79.
27 Ibid, at 75-76.
28 Ibid, at 79.
29 Ibid, at 66, a reference to procedure reported by Ga. State Advisory Committee.
30 According to unofficial figures cited by the Commission at p. 50 of the Report, no
nonwhite persons were registered in 6 Miss. counties in which the majority of the population
is nonwhite (1955 year). Only 3.89 percent of the total 1950 population of voting-age
nonwhites were registered in 1950. The unofficial sources for these figures include a former
22
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race, were available in Tennessee. In Texas nonwhites were 13.5 percent of all
registered voters, although only 12.3 percent of the total voting age population.,,
In Arkansas nonwhites were 11.4 percent of all registered voters, but 20.5 percent
of the total voting age population, bringing Arkansas just beneath the 2 to 1
ratio.1
On the basis of the statistics and the record accumulated by the Commission,
it is not surprising that the Commission concludes that "something more than
apathy" 8 causes the proportionately small Negro vote. The Commission's conclusion, indeed, finds support in the attitude taken by some southern officials,
despite such denials as Alabama's Governor Patterson's that "Alabama has anything
to hide."'3 4 Refusal of Alabama officials to cooperate with the Commission led
one southern newspaper to observe: "Mr. Patterson's pugnacious attitude cannot
help but create the impression in other parts of the country that we've got something to hide."3 5
It would not be fair to conclude that southern opposition to the Civil Rights
Act of 1957 and to additional legislation in 1960 to protect voting rights further
negatived the notion that voluntary "apathy" among Negroes is a principal cause
in low voting figures. But southern opposition to voting legislation, in the middle
of contentions of voting apathy among Negroes, created an inevitable reaction:
why all the fuss? Certainly the mood of some Negroes in the South during the
development of the Martin Luther King peaceful resistance movement, the
spiritual father, perhaps, of this year's sit-ins in restaurants and snack bars, does
not connote apathy. Moreover, the startling shift from county to county in
registration figures manifests something else than apathy. During the Senate
filibuster of 1960, perhaps the most profound southern voice in the Senate was
that of Spessard Holland, senior Senator from Florida, who told his colleagues:
"I do not know what has happened in Gadsden County. It is to me one
of the dearest counties in the State ...
"Mr. President, there is a climate in that county adverse to the general
participation of Negroes in voting. Therefore they do not register and vote.
Human nature will be present in this problem wherever we find it. It happens
that the two counties on the east and west of Gadsden County have very large
participation in voting by their Negro citizens. The county just east is Leon
County, where the State capital, Tallahassee, is located. It is a sensitive county
politically. In it, as the record shows, Negro citizens have registered heavily
and have voted heavily ...
"Something happened in Gadsden County. It is a fine county. Good
people live in Gadsden County, both white and colored. The situation in that
Attorney General of Mississippi, a master's thesis published at the University of Mississippi,
and a survey conducted by a newspaper at Jackson, Mississippi.
31 Ibid, at 51, citing unofficial figures.
2 Ibid, at 42 citing figures from official sources.
38 Ibid, at 52.
84 Ibid, at 86.
85 From The Lee County (Ala.) Bulletin, quoted in the Report at p. 85.
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county is reflected in the climate there, which is not favorable as yet toward
general participation by the Negro citizens in voting. So they have not
registered and voted.
"I wish at this time to digress long enough to expand on this thought
of human nature as having a great deal to do with this problem. Let us not
forget that even though there is no threat, or even though there is no violence,
or even any refusal by officials to allow Negroes to vote, if a Negro knows
that the climate of opinion is strongly adverse to his registering and voting,
realizing that the land belongs in large measure to the white people, that
the banks belong to the white people, that the stores belong to the white
people, that the county officials are entirely white people, and that the people
who employ the teachers in the public school--and of course our Negro
schools have nothing but Negro teachers-are white, a Negro under such a
situation many times tends to be apprehensive. I believe we can all understand that that is quite natural.
"Evidently the Negroes in that county, in that very small county which
does not have as many voters as one of the precincts in my hometown, the
small town of Bartow, Fla., do feel that apprehensive." 36

The social sciences should be ready, perhaps, to admit that much labor is
expended within the discipline by elaborate "proofs" of generally accepted propositions. The proposition that Negroes are effectively disenfranchised in some

southern areas cannot be gainsaid. (See, for example, the record in the Washington Parishcase).37 But it is a measure of our quest for accuracy and our sensitivity
to charges of inadequate documentation that we labor to demonstrate the incontrovertible.
The Recommendations of the Commission
The hearings of the Commission, then, showed a pattern of deprivation
throughout the South. This deprivation is achieved in many ways, which vary

from state to state and from county to county. Behind the methods in use looms
the spectre of variations in endless number, which could be applied in sequence
or simultaneously, forming a complex fortress of resistance to the ideal of universal suffrage. The problem facing the Commission was to recommend solutions
to the pattern of deprivation, solutions that in themselves might create a minimum
of new problems and animosities.
The Report of the Commission contained four recommendations. Having
found "a general deficiency of information pertinent to the phenomenon of nonvoting", 38 the Commission called for compilation by the Bureau of the Census
of registration and voting statistics by race, color, and national origin. Since
registration and voting application forms in some areas can be destroyed under
86 106 CONG. REc. 3599-3600 (Mar. 1, 1960).
87 United States of America v. Curtis M. Thomas, Registrar of Voters of Washington
Parish, La., U. S. Sup. Ct., Feb. 29, 1960. Reference is made, infra, to certain aspects of the
record, to which the Solicitor General made reference in oral argument. The provisions in
the La. Const., the record showed, were used to disenfranchise Negroes who miscalculated by
as little as one day the number of days of their life.
88 Op. cit. supra, at 136.
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state law O to resist federal investigations, the Commission recommended that
Congress enact a federal requirement that registration and voting records be
preserved for five years subject to public inspection during that period. 40 One of
the methods of depriving Negroes of the opportunity to vote is inaction or
failure to act by registrars. This method supplements affirmative acts of discrimination. The Commission recommended an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 to establish affirmative duties inconsistent with such inaction, and to
make failure to act "under color of state law, arbitrarily and without legal justification or cause ... in such manner as to deprive or threaten to deprive any individual or group of individuals of the opportunity to ... vote", by any person or

group of persons a civil wrong subject to injunctive relief.41 As mentioned above,
a recommendation was included to allow the Commission to petition for court
orders enforcing Commission subpoenas. 42 Under the Civil Rights Act as passed
in 1957 the Commission was required to request the Department of Justice to file
such petitions.43 The Commission found that this procedure was cumbersome and
unsound.
By far the most discussed recommendation by the Commission was that
Congress should authorize the President to appoint temporary federal registrars
who would administer the state qualification laws and issue to all individuals
found qualified, registration certificates entitling them to vote in federal elections.
As the proposal appeared in the Report, the President would appoint the temporary registrars only upon certification by the Civil Rights Commission that sworn
allegations of discrimination and unsuccessful registration in the locality where
44
the temporary registrars were to function were well-founded.
This recommendation was the source of much of the Congressional debate
on civil rights in 1960. Southern spokesmen echoed the objection of Commissioner
Battle:
I disagree with the proposal for the appointment of a Federal
Registrar which would place in the hands of the Federal Government a vital
part of the election process so zealously
guarded and carefully reserved to the
45
States by the founding fathers."

Finally, three of the Commissioners recommended a constitutional amendment. The proposed amendment would read:

39 See the Report, at p. 137, for discussion of retaliatory action taken against the Commission by the Alabama Legislature.
40 Op. cit. supra, at 138.
a1Ibid, at 138.
42Ibid, at 139.
4371 STAT. 636 (1957), 42 U. S. C. § 1975d(g) (1958).
44 05. cit. supra, at 141-2.
4 bid.
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"Article XXIII
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State or by any person
for any cause except inability to meet State age or length-of-residence requirements uniformly applied to all persons within the State, or legal confinement
at the time of registration or election. This right to vote shall include the
right to register or otherwise qualify to vote, and to have one's vote counted.
"Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."

Three commissioners dissented from the recommended amendment. Commissioner Battle joined Vice Chairman Storey and Commissioner Carlton in
dissent. They argued that the legislative remedies proposed by the Commission
would prove adequate, and that no constitutional amendment should be enacted
unless it were shown by experience that statutory relief could not safeguard the
right to vote. In the debate on civil rights in the Chambers of Congress in 1960,
almost nothing was heard about the proposed amendment. Liberals and conservatives, northerners and southerners alike, neglected it.
Can the legislative remedies proposed by the Commission or adopted by
Congress break the heart of resistance? Probably no final judgment can yet
be made. History would indicate that the immediate influence of legislation on
mores and social attitudes is limited. History--and the attitude of some southerners and their spokesmen-would indicate too that the will to resist may harden
as legislative pressure increases. Numerous southern spokesmen warned that the
effect of civil rights legislation might be to increase racial repressions in the
South, over the short run.46 No doubt some of these warnings were sincere, and
surely their validity can be logically defended, even if yielding to them would be
akin to allowing mob domination of the government, and poor precedent in a
democracy.
Such warnings cannot be said, of course, to be the basis for neglect of the
proposed constitutional amendment. The warnings were directed at the legislation
pending in Congress. The warnings would appear to be most apt in reference to
legislation aimed patently at the South. The temporary registrar plan, of course,
is in essence the voice of an America that is skeptical about the willingness of
state officials in the south to comply with federal law. The proposed constitutional
amendment would change the law of voter qualification in all but five states. Its
effects would be felt in North as well as South. Under the amendment there
would be no federal officials who would be symbols in their person of a resented
46 E. g., see remarks of Rep. Robert Hemphill (S. C.), 106 CONG. REC. 4958-9 (March
11, 1960). "If I am a Member of this House and happen to be back here when the fire
starts burning in places where it is not supposed to burn, if the Maker allows me, I intend
to remind those of you who did vote for this legislation that you were told on this day and
on yesterday exactly what it was that you were enacting."
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central government. Nor would a checkerboard pattern of registration procedures
be established in which federal officials would have the registration responsibility
in some communities, but state or local officials would have that responsibility
elsewhere. This checkerboard pattern will, of course, create resentment at the
county courthouse level. The local registrar, removed from office, will grumble,
and many of his peers will regard registration by the federal official-even when
the federal registrar is the local postmaster-as an invasion of local prerogatives
and as "discrimination in reverse". In contrast, the constitutional amendment
would breed no such resentment. Its effects would be uniform, national, impersonal, and definite. No threat of federal executive intervention would hang over
the head of the local officials.
Issues in any litigation would be simplified: is the complainant of age under
state law? How long has the complainant been a resident of the state, the county,
or the precinct?
This much having been said about the proposed amendment, the inevitable
question is why the amendment has been neglected. The staunchest senatorial
advocates of civil rights legislation have not advanced the amendment.
The overwhelming reason, probably, is political. During the congressional
debate this year on civil rights, very little mail was received by members of Congress on the issue. Virtually all of the expressed interest in legislation came from
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The NAACP
was an active lobby. Years of denial of the constitutional rights of American
Negroes gave the lobby a powerful weapon-the weapon of crusading self-righteousness. The lobby's appeal was not always cerebral; it was capable of emotion,
for which few could censure. A telegram from Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary
of the NAACP, dated March 3, 1960, to pro-civil rights senators manifested the
NAACP mood:
"after this sturdy display by you and other advocates of strong civil rights bill,
the filibusterers are about to be offered victory in the form of emasculated
version. No bill which has even grudging acquiescence of Russell, Eastland
and Company can be acceptable to citizens for civil rights.... National Association for Advancement of Colored People soberly advises that current widespread dissatisfaction of Negro population with status quo clearly suggests
that Congress should not temporize on action overdue by at least two generations."

With civil rights advocates indignant about action "overdue by at least two
generations", the cumbersome amendment process could hardly have seemed
attractive to civil rights proponents in Congress. Advancement of the amendment,
even if coupled with legislative remedies, might well have raised the politically
fearful charge of compromise. The lobby was clearly impatient.
The impatience was demonstrated by another event in the 1960 debate.
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This was the decision by Senator Javits and Senator Douglas to seek poll tax
elimination through legislation, not constitutional amendment, even though doubts
about the constitutionality of such legislation were expressed. Introducing the
poll tax elimination bill (S. 2868), Senator Javits told the Senate:
"If once we adopt the idea that we have to proceed in this field by constitutional amendment, it seems to me we handicap ourselves in the normal current
of civil rights legislation. Therefore, if we do not need a constitutional
amendment-and I think I can demonstrate that irrefutably in the legal discussion which will take place-then we who believe in eliminating the poll
tax as a requirement for voting should certainly not seek to do it ourselves.
"Then, too, Mr. President, as everyone knows, the constitutional amendment
method is a very difficult and cumbersome one; for example, between 1927
and 1959, 1,819 constitutional amendments were proposed, but only 3 of that
enormous number
were ratified by the States as amendments to the U. S.
4 7
Constitution."

Senator Javits noted that in the civil rights field, "it seems inevitable that on many
major bills to secure these rights, charges of unconstitutionality are constantly
48

raised."
It is true that a constitutional amendment requires the assent of 38 legislatures or state conventions, a truly "cumbersome" process. It has been noted
that the overwhelming number of states, from New York to Alaska, have literacy
requirements or other limitations upon universal suffrage, beyond the limitations
of age or residence. Some of these would hesitate to ratify the proposed constitutional amendment, and the southern states could be expected to refuse ratification.
It may also be true that a system of federal registrars or referees would prove to
be adequate safeguards for the franchise. History and the record of southern
parliamentary ingenuity compel skepticism about the adequacy of the statutory
remedies.
However sufficient the legislative palliatives recommended or adopted may
prove to be, the proponents of universal suffrage should surely desire an arsenal
as potent and as varied as the arsenal of the resisters. One wonders whether the
federal registrar, a local federal official whose federal career may depend upon the
views or desires of his neighbors and his United States Senators, would have
sufficient independence to handle complicated and inherently subjective qualification requirements objectively. In addition to career pressures the registrar would
be subject to social pressures. In fact, no pressures might be required, for it is
likely that the registrar would reflect the attitudes and fears of his community.
It is doubtful whether the statute recommended by the Commission allowing
establishment of temporary registrars would be invoked by the President of the
United States. It is not difficult to imagine that some southern communities would
106 CONG. REc. 740 (Jan. 20, 1960).
48 Ibid.
47
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become expert at enrolling Negro voters at a pace fast enough to avoid the
temporary registrar system, and slow enough to preserve the political impotency
of the southern Negro. Surely the foot-dragging with "all deliberate speed" in
the school integration cases would support such a prediction.
At least one spokesman for the South impliedly supported the principle of
the proposed amendment. Said Senator Spessard Holland of Florida:
"... in my view the wholesome situation is for us to have a universal suffrage
subject only to age requirements, residence requirements, and lawful records
requirements. In our State we have no educational test and no "grandfather
clause" that makes eligible some white people whose fathers or grandfathers
49

were veterans. We have no special consideration for any class of people."

It is submitted that the elimination of literacy requirements and other qualifications as conditions precedent to voting is merited even apart from the present
concern on racial discrimination. At one time in our history, the ability to read
and write, or other indications of learning, may have had some significance in
relation to the ballot. Today, when knowledge of world events is available
through a variety of media not requiring literacy, although reading remains the
best source of information, the raison d'etre of the literacy requirement is obscure.
Why should the qualifications for voting be even stiffer than the qualifications of
testamentary capacity?
Some criticism has been expressed to the effect that the proposed constitutional amendment would allow idiots, lunatics, or imbeciles not institutionalized
to vote. It is doubtful that idiots, lunatics, or imbeciles would exercise the franchise in significant number. It is also doubtful whether idiots, lunatics, or imbeciles are necessarily without basis upon which to make political judgments, and
it cannot be assumed that for the purposes of voting, they are so unable to determine where their self-interest and the self-interest of the country lie that they
should be denied the vote. There is no indication that states imposing only age
and residence qualifications have suffered as a result. And the "parade of horrors"
which this argument against the constitutional amendment can conjure up is less
dreadful than the actual, present, horror of disenfranchised Americans.
In conclusion it is suggested that the proposed constitutional amendment
merited consideration by Congress, and received none; that no civil rights statute
can put an end to the complicated litigation, abuses in the application of subjective registration tests, or terminate the long, hard, road to universal suffrage.
Even adoption of the amendment, alone or in combination with legislation, would
provide no panacea. Discrimination can be accomplished by subjective treatment
of voting applications, without reference to literacy or mental qualifications, as
shown by the record in the Washington Parish case. In Washington Parish, the
49106

CONG. REC. 3598 (Mar. 1, 1960).
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United States showed, Negro voters were denied registration on the most trivial
of grounds. The application form required the applicant to indicate his race.
Negroes who wrote "colored", "Negro", "c", or "n", were challenged and disqualified; the sole correct answer, the local officials held, was "black". Happily,
the Court affirmed an order requiring them to be registered.
Behind the decision to ignore the proposed constitutional amendment lies
the fact that the public is largely indifferent to the civil rights cause. The white
south is aroused; the Negroes of America sense the dawn of a new day. They
know that they are able now to shape events, even as in former days events took
them up, enslaved them, repressed them. But the general public wants neither
extreme. The civil rights forces have concentrated on the elected representatives,
with bold political pressure but they have neglected the public at large.
In a country of almost universal literacy, the literacy test as a prerequisite to
registration or voting can be little more than a tool for mischief. It is doubtful
whether restrictions upon the franchise which affect the unconfined mentally ill
or ex-convicts serve a useful purpose. There is no indication that such restrictions
produce more intelligent decisions at the polls, and it is probable that they are
anachronisms or, at best, traditions. Especially in view of the findings by the
Commission, restrictions upon the franchise should be reviewed. The cause of
civil rights will be advanced if its champions interest the general public in these
problems of public policy. Today, the writer believes, most citizens view the
civil rights struggle as spectators view a contest, but they do not root very hard.
PostScript
The Senate has passed, with amendments, H.R. 8601, the Civil Rights Bill
of 1960. Congress has rejected the temporary registrar plan proposed by the
Commission. A court-appointed referee plan suggested by the Eisenhower adminisiration has been approved, but this plan is hardly less susceptible to objections of fe&ral interference in state matters. It excludes the possibility of legal
and moral leadership from the White House under the 1960 civil rights legislation.
Under this 1960 Bill a federal district judge may appoint a voting referee
who shall receive applications for court orders declaring applicants qualified to
vote and shall take evidence and report his findings to the district court. Applicants would be required to apply for registration first from state officers before
they could petition for a federal district court order. Such an order can
affect only federal elections. The referee must be a registered voter within the
judicial district. Actual enrolment of a voter remains with state officials, but state
officials who knowingly disregard a court order may be punished for contempt
of court. No order can be issued unless there is a finding of a pattern or practice
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of disenfranchisement and unless the applicant is found to be "qualified under state
law to vote".
Citizens concerned with the civil rights cause can only hope that the 1960
legislation will make possible a more complete Negro franchise, and will not
hamper future efforts to achieve better legislation if the hope is unfulfilled. The
fundamental problem of state qualification laws has not been tackled. The procedures established under the 1960 legislation are not sleek, simple or swift. It
cannot be said now that the proposed law represents a significant advance, although
in practice it may prove better than it seems.
JOSEPH P. JOSEPHSON

THE USE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS TO MINIMIZE
EMPLOYMENT TAXES-THE DOUBTFUL CASES
The social security and unemployment taxes due from proprietors are based
upon wages paid employees. If services are performed by independent contractors
the compensation afforded is free of these taxes.' The 1958 amendments to the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) increased the amount due from both
employer and employee to 3% of the wages paid.2 Unemployment taxes which
are paid by the employer remained at 2.7% to the state and .3% to the federal
government. 8
This increasing tax and ever-constant bookkeeping burden can be alleviated
if the individual performing the services could be placed on an independent contractor basis. The independent contractor would thereupon be liable to pay 4 %
126 U.S.C. (I.R.C. 1954) 5 3306.
226 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3111 as amended 1958. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act
requires that a certain amount (currently 3%) be withheld from wages paid employees and
that an equal amount be contributed by the employer toward the Social Security Fund.
S The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 26 U.S.C. § 3301 requires that an
amount equal to 3% of wages paid be deposited in the federal fund but a credit up to 90%
of that due is given to contributions made to state unemployment funds that qualify under
federal standards. All states enacted the requisite unemployment tax laws and the 2.7% due
to state funds became uniform. Many state laws so passed gave a more restrictive definition
of independent contractors so that some individuals might be exempt from FUTA taxes but
liable under the state unemployment tax acts (SUTA).

